2024 has been a pivotal year for the launch of several international initiatives in the field of submarine cables. In this report, we look at some of them, explaining their significance for the industry and their impact on national plans.
ITU involvement
Last May, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)+20 Forum High-Level Event 2024 1 was held in Geneva, Switzerland, co-organized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other UN agencies such as UNESCO, UNDP and UNCTAD. A special panel of government authorities and cable industry executives was arranged to address submarine cable issues, particularly the need to improve the resilience of the world’s submarine telecommunication networks.
Just a few months later, this has led to the call for nominations towards the creation of an international Advisory Body Group, composed of experts in the field of cable resilience, with an aim to promote dialogue and collaboration on potential ways and means to improve resilience of this critical infrastructure that powers global communications and the digital economy. The following months of this year will consolidate its structure and composition, and lead to a Submarine Cable Resilience Summit in early 2025. The ITU is partnering with ICPC in this effort.
In summary, these new initiatives launched by the ITU open a fresh phase in the telecommunications submarine cable industry, with the direct involvement of an UN body committed to foster multistakeholder dialogue and building consensus on telecommunications issues.
European Commission Recommendation
In February 2024, the European Commission published a Recommendation 2 setting out a series of actions at national and European Union (EU) level to improve the security and resilience of submarine cables through better coordination across the EU, both in terms of governance and funding.
EU Member States were invited to work with the European Commission to assess the impact of this Recommendation by December 2025 in order to identify appropriate ways forward. Indeed, it is a first step to accurately describe the regional risks to the cyber and physical security of submarine cable infrastructures, not only those related to their supply chains, which will lead to regular stress tests and further obligations for submarine cable owners.
And it is precisely in the context of such initiatives that policymakers should be aware of and not overlook two current realities. First, according to the 2024 ICPC statistics 3, the major risks to submarine cables continue to be negligent acts of fishing and anchoring, rather than intentional misconduct such as sabotage.
It is likely that the geopolitical confrontation in this multipolar world will continue in crescendo, but this does not mean that Brussels should forget to address the major risks by creating an effective deterrent effect with severe penalties for those who most frequently endanger the submarine cables in Europe. Some would argue that it is a matter of national security, when in fact it is logical thinking based on evidence and proven facts to effectively reduce the average of 500 cable failures per year in the world and defend their own digital sovereignty.
Second, the dominance of OTTs in the global capacity market is a fact, leaving less room for telecommunication companies to invest in new undersea infrastructure. Therefore, there should at least be no regulatory barriers against the latter, otherwise they will gradually disappear with any coups de grâce, considering that such constraints are precisely not a good recipe for promoting a competitive market, or even a wise decision to ensure the diversification of routes.
By 2025, European policymakers will have to decide how to protect their already weakened telecom wholesale sector while attracting the major OTT investments. In the midst of geopolitical tensions around the world, it is not an easy dilemma to solve when better conditions for buying and installing cables are evident for the hyperscalers, using their leverage of dominant positions and economies of scale. How can an incumbent operator with 3 or 4 regional cable systems compete with an OTT that has global reach and can regularly launch a new system that is 5 times more powerful than those of the 2000 boom era?
Defending competition
In every quarter of 2024, there was a public announcement by an OTT about new mega projects of subsea systems in different oceans of the planet, adding them to their already rich resources of an immense amount of capacity contracted from suppliers. This is a natural expansion plan in any industry, as we have seen in the past with the invasion of large supermarkets against small grocers, or the dominance of international airlines on major routes. However, the lessons learned in these sectors show that each country ultimately regulated the sector to effectively protect its own national industry from extinction.
Now, a long-term regulatory strategy is urgently needed to protect this ecosystem, otherwise only a few wholesale operators will be left in the arena, forcing local governments to inevitably surrender their digital sovereignty to the agenda interests of foreign private companies.
Moreover, public scrutiny of the usual secret conditions under confidential agreements between some governments and OTTs to receive these investments is still a missing piece. This is crucial if countries are not to fall into false traps for short-term gains, such as sacrificing the sustainability commitments set out in the Paris Agreement in order to speed up environmental approvals for the installation of their usual data centres and/or new submarine cable systems.
Furthermore, in order to defend its own digital sovereignty, it is essential for each country to maintain a variety of different suppliers and cable routes that make a connectivity network both robust and competitive. Currently, the submarine cable maintenance sector presents its market failures with an inefficient distribution of goods and services. This was demonstrated by the multiple cable failures in West Africa in March 2024, which clearly exposed delays or even unavailability of enough cable maintenance vessels to repair the affected submarine cables. If an OTT system had been damaged, would it have been in the same queue waiting for the ambulance?
Government delays in granting maintenance permits in certain countries, an old fleet of cable maintenance vessels with an average age of +20 years, and other excuses to divert public attention may always be around the corner. However, some countries are already taking steps to avoid these market inefficiencies, such as India with its studies to have its own fleet, or the French government's acquisition of Alcatel Submarine Networks.
Geopolitics also plays a role in these market constraints, as governments increasingly use their influence to isolate others or ban cable maintenance providers. Under normal circumstances this would be tolerated in a competitive world, but things are approaching a breaking point in the light of global domination, with these market distortions colliding with the universal right of every person to be connected. Indeed, this is a red line if we want no one to be left behind.
Security: from hysteria to pragmatism
Throughout 2023, many security initiatives were launched, and in 2024 these were implemented with further developments. For example, the NATO Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in Northwood, England, based at NATO's Allied Maritime Command, with the clear purpose of monitoring the security of submarine energy pipelines and cables against hybrid threats and, as officials further explained, to deny any aggressor the cover of "plausible deniability".
Less than 10% of cable failures appear in the media out of the 500 per year. It is not uncommon to find that such coverage is biased with propaganda mixed with vague information, turning a simple fishing trawler incident into a massive conspiracy, followed by geopolitical recriminations, inconclusive investigative reports, or even misleading information for an untrained eye in the submarine cable industry.
Accordingly, it would be useful for NATO to publish its own statistics on any sabotage or malicious acts against the submarine telecommunications cable networks, so that the general public is aware and can confirm that these threats are indeed real and not being pushed by researchers with an arms race agenda. It would also ensure that responses are proportional to the actual level of risk. In some cases, without concrete evidence, there is a risk of overreaction, which could lead to unnecessary escalation. This kind of transparency would serve to depoliticize the issue, showing that any responses are based on genuine security concerns rather than being driven by geopolitical competition.
In addition, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a multinational coalition of ten Northern European nations, has been established and has conducted military exercises to enhance the security of critical submarine infrastructure, while NATO is co-funding a project to find alternative ways to restore communications in the event of an attack on these submarine assets.
Other initiatives continue to forge their own regional paths, such as the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience to improve security in the Indo-Pacific, and Australia's new Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre, launched in mid-2024. Hopefully, all of these and others would contribute globally to improving relations between several nations that have had their submarine cable installation processes severely disrupted, as happened in the South China Sea or the Aegean Sea.
National regulatory changes
In May 2024 the Cook Islands enacted new legislation 4 that imposes fines of up to USD 153,000 on those who negligently damage submarine cables. Other sanctions include mandatory reporting of such incidents with fines of up to USD 12,000, approaching the best international standards adopted by Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay in this area to create a deterrent effect against negligent actors.
On the other hand, earlier this year, Panama also approved a resolution by the Panama Maritime Authority that includes sanctions with a limit of only USD 10,000 for any participation in conduct that may cause damage to submarine cables. Why the difference in criteria between these two countries? It is well known that the maritime industry has its stronghold in the latter country, which has the largest ship registry in the world. Unfortunately, this has led to the erosion of its own telecom authority's digital agenda to become an international connectivity hub.
In India, the ministerial authorities have yet to implement the "Recommendations on Licensing Framework and Regulatory Mechanism for Submarine Cable Landing in India" issued by the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India (TRIA) in the middle of last year. Such guidelines should update their national regulation and it would be very useful for other countries in the region to follow the same path.
As of July 2024, the new conditions for issuing licences for the installation of submarine telecommunication cables have come into force in Vietnam. The new Telecommunications Law 5 enacted in 2023 also includes other specific regulations on data centres, cloud computing, and OTT communications that will come into force on 1 January 2025, allowing the country to receive further investment with clear and updated rules.
Other countries are actively engaging in a sincere dialogue with the cable industry, such as Qatar with its recent consultation process 6, Malaysia with the flexibilization of its cabotage policy to allow foreign vessels to repair submarine cables in its domestic waters, and the Indonesian government, which held a workshop in July 2024 with the assistance of the International Cable Protection Committee. In addition, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continues its efforts in the Indian Ocean region to improve the regulatory framework, organizing workshops and trying to fill the existing regulatory gaps.
Normally, most countries would follow a discrete consultation process, inviting key national stakeholders to work together to improve their regulations to facilitate the licensing process or remove unnecessary burdens. Most of them are convergent with their national maritime spatial initiatives, or at least designed not to collide with them.
During these rounds of consultations, it is encouraging to see that many original proposals from different seabed users are on the table, such as the obligation for future cable owners to donate the survey data of submarine cables to coastal states. This could be used by them for further exploration of their continental shelf. In fact, at the last IOC/UNESCO conference for the Ocean Decade 2024, Seabed2030, held in Barcelona, Spain in April 2024, the issue of how to obtain this invaluable data was debated, unfortunately focusing only on existing subsea cables, where consensus in submarine cable consortiums to release such data is difficult to achieve.
Jurisdictional concerns
In July 2023, the new framework agreement for the Maritime Regulatory Authority (MARA) came into force to speed up the approval process for future submarine cables in Ireland. It also has a critical role in the maintenance of this subsea infrastructure, which must be consistent with the national maritime spatial agenda.
Similarly, at the end of last year in Portugal, the government issued a new regulation 7 aimed at simplifying the licensing process for submarine cables and data centres, creating corridors to protect submarine assets, among other positive measures for the industry. The country has been very active in attracting new submarine cable systems, competing with its European neighbours as a gateway for African and transatlantic cables, with a pioneering domestic SMART cable project underway. However, some voices have raised concerns about the possibility of using this regulation to impose restrictions on the installation of future cables on its vast extended continental shelf.
Meanwhile, the US Team Telecom continues to exercise its extraterritorial powers whenever a cable system lands in the US. Inspections are conducted at landing stations in other countries, challenging any national sovereignty rights. Accordingly, prospective cable owners are reluctant to use the same cable landing station for a segment connecting to the U.S. and are considering splitting their plans into two systems to avoid falling under its jurisdiction for the remaining cable system segments that do not land on U.S. soil, changing cable suppliers, and even changing the name of the cable system.
Therefore, there is still a lack of international cooperation efforts that could give certainty and confidence to the states. This is a missing piece that could be filled by the ITU. Otherwise, a regulatory escalation seems to be the inevitable way in the following years, as all nations would be entitled and encouraged to adopt similar jurisdictional rights across borders.
BBNJ and ISA
The High Seas Treaty or UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) continues its ratification process and is expected to reach the 60 required to enter into force. Meanwhile, the submarine cable industry is still debating the requirements for future installation of these assets in the new marine protected areas that will be demarcated and protected.
This treaty requires Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for some proposed activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction, raising the question of whether any submarine cable would trigger this obligation and, subsequently, which states would be involved in such a process. It is likely that SMART Cables will have a safe place to grow and enhance its capabilities here if its regulatory challenges are finally resolved by the stakeholders.
Also, it is worth noting for such EIA processes that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea issued an opinion 8 in May 2024 ruling that carbon dioxide is a marine pollutant. The case was brought by nine island nations seeking greater protection from climate change, and a similar ruling is expected later this year from both the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
On the other hand, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) continues to develop new regulations, especially with regard to exploitation activities, which hopefully will always require a coordination process with submarine cable owners in the affected areas. Other deep-sea mining plans in national jurisdictional waters are underway, so nearby telecom operators should remain vigilant to act proactively to protect their infrastructure.
Cable landing agreements
As the industry continues to evolve with open cables, spectrum sharing and other developments, legal frameworks are also evolving, such as cable landing agreements. Originally, these were ancillary agreements to a consortium agreement (Construction and Maintenance Agreement or C&MA) where a co-owner was appointed to be responsible for the landing stations, local permits, ownership of the local portion of the system, and to grant an Indefinite Right of Use (IRU) in favour of the remaining members of the consortium. Depending on the jurisdiction, these arrangements have been reduced in recent years to allow non-members of the cable consortium to offer space in their landing stations without even being co-owners or users of the system.
In addition, in some countries, such as Spain, the regional government of Catalonia grants general authorizations for the simultaneous installation of several future cables in a specific designated area, thereby reserving the area for these subsea infrastructures. This method can also reduce the time and cost associated with obtaining individual permits for each new installation.
Looking ahead
The legal and regulatory changes in 2024 show that international initiatives to protect submarine cables are now on the agenda of several international organizations. The new involvement of the ITU is a positive sign that new winds are blowing in other public forums in support of a sector that is vital for defending people's connectivity rights, which may lead to further regulatory developments in the coming years.
At the same time, many countries are updating regulatory frameworks to adapt to the new OTT dominance of the sector, trying to be competitive and at the same time converge with maritime planning initiatives, a key issue to avoid conflicts with other seabed users in the long term.
The coming year will show whether these and other initiatives are effective in adding value to the submarine cable industry, which urgently needs pragmatic solutions to improve its resilience and market efficiency.
1. WSIS Action Line C5: Beneath the Waves: Safeguarding Global Connectivity through Secure Submarine Networks. Available at: https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/forum/2024/Agenda/RPWeb?live=False&fs=X7674&cb=OR4SC
2. See “European Commission Recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructures”, 21 February 2024. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-security-and-resilience-submarine-cable-infrastructures
3. Palmer-Felgate, A. “Global Cable Repair Data Analysis”, ICPC Annual Plenary, Singapore, 1 May 2024.
4. Manatua Cable Protection Act Bill 2024 No 5., May 2024. Available at: https://parliamentci.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Manatua-Cable-Protection-Bill-2024.pdf
5. Law on Telecommunications 2023 National Assembly, Vietnam, November 24, 2023. Available at: https://dazpro.com/law24-2023-vietnam-on-telecommunications
6. See "CRA Reference Offer for Access to Submarine Cable Landing Station (SCLS) International Connectivity (ROA for SCLS) Services" issued by the Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA), May 2024. Available at: https://www.cra.gov.qa/en/document/cra-reference-offer-for-access-to-submarine
7. Dispatch no 11808/2023, 22 November 2024, Portugal. Available at: https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/despacho/11808-2023-224603343
8. Advisory Opinion in Case No 31, ITLOS, 21 May 2024. Available at: https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf
Andrés Fígoli is the author of the book “Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Telecommunication Submarine Cables” and is the director of Fígoli Consulting, where he provides legal and regulatory advice on all aspects of subsea cable work. Mr. Fígoli graduated in 2002 from the Law School of the University of the Republic (Uruguay), holds a Master of Laws (LLM) from Northwestern University, and has worked on submarine cable cases for almost 21 years in a major wholesale telecommunication company. He also served as Director and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Cable Protection Committee (2015-2023).
This report was first published in Submarine Telecoms Forum Industry Report 2024/2025, Issue 13.
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